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On writing to Boswell in 1773, James Beattie's annus mirabilis, Samuel
Johnson declared: 'Beattie is so caressed, and invited, and treated, and liked,
and flattered, by the great, that I can see nothing of him'.1 Beattie's almost
exact contemporary William Cowper claims to 'see' Beattie, but only in
bewilderingly hyperbolic terms: 'his own character appears in every page,
and, which is rare, we see not only the writer but the man. And that man
so gentle, so well-temper'd, that it is necessary to love him if one has the
least sense of what is lovely'.2 In 1773 James Beattie's popular success was
granted its permanent apotheosis by Joshua Reynolds in his allegorical
painting 'The Triumph of Truth', which is now housed in Marischal College
Aberdeen. Reynolds' Beattie smiles modestly, and is dramatically lit against
a stormy background. He grips a copy of his own book ofphilosophy, a sure
defence against the whirling chaos around him. Meanwhile, his enemies
Voltaire and Hume are confounded and thrust into the darkness.
Beattie's ascendancy was brief, although Reynolds' extravagant image is a
reminder that it had been a major cultural phenomenon. The debt owed by
the romantics to Beattie is an obvious one, acknowledged by Wordsworth
in particular. As late as 1820, John Clare's publisher insisted that 'the
peasant poet' christen his latest volume The Village Minstrel. John Lucas
regards this as a deliberate attempt to cash in on the enduring popularity of
Beattie's poem
-
'that sentimental tale of the inspired bard'. Very recently,
Everard King has noted Beattie's proto-Coleridgian understanding of the
difference between fancy and imagination, showing how The Prelude and
The Excursion expand latent possibilities in the first and second parts of The
Minstrel respectively. T. J. Diffey refers to the influence of Beattie's aesthetic
theory on developing 'romantic' ideology. Robert Gittings connects The
Minstrel with the The Eve of St. Agnes and Marilyn Gaull identifies Beattie's
fingerprints on Shelley's Alastor and Byron's Childe Harold's Pilgrimage.3,
These and other connections are so various and so plausible that the case
for Beattie's importance is in danger of being prematurely closed once too
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easily established. Insufficient attention has been paid to the nature as
opposed to the mere extent of The Minstrel's reverberative capacity. King at
least hints at a more interesting trail of influence: 'Not only did early readers
interpret the poem as a special kind of refutation of sceptical philosophy
but also they may have read the dichotomy in the poem between reason
gone mad and the restorative power of nature as an indication of the dawn
of a new age of enlightenment and culture'.4 Even when uncapitalised, 'the
age of enlightenment' is, surely, an unfortunate phrase. 'Reason gone mad'
is a better pointer however, illuminating one of Beattie's central concerns
and identifying a continuum of oppositional thinking which links Beattie
decisively with evolving romantic sensibility. For aside (but scarcely apart)
from all the conscious and unconscious borrowings, the abstractions, the
circumlocutions, and the metaphorical topographies, there is a profound
identity of concern which repays study. Beattie and Wordsworth share a
need for a philosophy of the great outdoors, a philosophy that imposes
itself gradually on the senses and claims a holistic rather than a merely
intellectual authority, a philosophy that somehow accommodates empirical
positivism alongside abstraction and introspection. Beattie demands a
philosophy that offers practical and enduring faith, not just persuasive
formulae; his natural religion accordingly claims to be more provisional
and yet more solid than academic philosophy.
Dorothy Wordsworth writing to Jane Pollard on 10 July 1793 describes
her brother as a '"strange and wayward wight'"
-
in other words, as Beattie's
'Minstrel' Edwin. '[I]ndeed the whole character of Edwin resembles
.
.
.William' she continues in the same letter.5 Describing a recent walk in
the vicinity of Lyme Regis, 20 October 1795, this wayward William/Edwin
quotes from The Minstrel in order to focus his emotions in response to the
majestic sound of the ocean (WordsworthLetters,p. 154). His debt to Beattie
is underwritten by a peculiar fascination with the latter's central imaginative
concerns
-
not only with the writer, but with Beattie the man.
For Beattie as for Wordsworth Nature in all its mysterious plenitude is
the source, or at least arena, of spiritual salvation. The Minstrel declares that
appreciation of the natural world is a prerequisite for religious reclamation:
Oh how canst thou renounce the boundless store
Of charms which Nature to her votary yields!
The warbling woodland, the resounding shore,
The pomp of groves, and garniture of fields;
All that the genial ray of morning gilds,
And all that echoes to the song of even,
All that the mountain's sheltering bosom shields,
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And all the dread magnificence of Heaven,
Oh, how canst thou renounce, and hope to be forgiven!
(Book I, IX,)6
Unlike Wordsworth at Racedown Lodge or at Grasmere, Beattie had
the benefit both of 'Nature's charms' and stimulating intellectual com-
panionship close at hand. Eighteenth-century Aberdeen was a powerful
contributor to the European Enlightenment. In the common rooms and
taverns in and around Marischal and King's Colleges, the fields of literary
theory, philosophy, linguistics, and sociology were developed and inter-
linked
-
for example at meetings of the Aberdeen 'Wise Club', an informal
body dedicated to interdisciplinary inquiry and mutual congratulation.
In 1764 the most serious philosopher within the group, Thomas Reid,
published An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common
Sense
-
a neo-empiricist attack on Hume and Berkeley. It was left to Beattie
to recast much of Reid's argument within a vastly more popular work, his
Essay on the Nature and Immutability ofTruth, in Opposition to Sophistry and
Scepticism (1770). Scepticism, argued Beattie, is all about demonstrating
the unbelievable; exhibiting formal proofs without inspiring belief: T have
known many who could not answer Berkeley's arguments', he affirmed,
T never knew one who believed his doctrine'.7 Philosophy should inspire
more than mere intellectual assent to certain propositions; it should be
about life, life should be about faith and faith should be about feeling: T
ought to be convinced only when I feel conviction; when I feel no con-
viction, I ought not to be convinced' (Beattie, Essay on Truth, p. 286). You
cannot (in other words), put down your books, leave your study and (like
Hume) live a fairly normal life. Hume and Berkeley had a responsibility
either fully to inhabit their own philosophy or to abandon it. Every time
either of them walked around a hole in the road, or stepped aside to avoid
a fast-moving vehicle, they betrayed and discredited their life's work.
The Essay on Truth took four years (1765-9) to write. In a letter to
Thomas Gray of 1 May 1770 Beattie bemoans the fact that he had been
forced to start reading contemporary philosophers having been awarded
the chair of Moral Philosophy at Marischal: T had little relish for them from
the first, and as I began to understand them better, I hated and despised
them the more'.8 Beattie saw his role as moral philosopher as a reassurer and
reinforcer of intuitive impulses, undermining metaphysics from within,
with Common Sense as his multi-purpose tool of sabotage: 'it may be urged
as an objection .
. .
that, ifwe grant common sense to be the ultimate judge
in all disputes, a great part of ancient and modern philosophy becomes
useless. I admit the objection with all my heart, in its full force and with
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all its consequences' (Beattie, Essay on Truth, p. 143). In a letter to William
Forbes, 31 January 1766, Beattie remarks T have of late been much engaged
in metaphysics; at least I have been labouring with all my might to overturn
that visionary scheme'.9 There is obvious slippage as to whether Beattie is
engaged in or engaged with metaphysics. It is notable that Beattie casually
implies that all systems of metaphysics somehow form one evil scheme.
And the word 'visionary' presents special pivotal problems which require
detailed attention.
Beattie detests controversy, formal logic and above all, linguistic philoso-
phy, philosophy which plays on the ambiguity ofwords so as to deconstruct
the conceptual universe. Reid had claimed that modern sceptics have
created their critique of causality by abusing the plain meaning of words.
Beattie seizes on the hint: 'A verbal disputant! What claim has he to do with
the laws of nature, with the observation of facts, with life and manners!
Let him not intrude upon the company of men of science; but repose with
his brethen Aquinus and Suarez, in the corner of some Gothic cloister,
dark as his understanding, and cold as his heart' (Beattie, Essay on Truth,
p. 2). The 'cloister' is of course a familar abusive metonym for scholastic
philosophy, but Beattie invests the term with renewed oppositional vigour.
Bad philosophy always emanates from enclosed places. Good philosophy
is contained only by the vault of heaven. Throughout the Essay on Truth
there is an indoor/outdoor dichotomy that craves the bolder expression
permissable in The Minstrel which was being written concurrently. While
Beattie was sweating over his Hume, Edwin was roaming the countryside.
Forty years later, The Prelude would contrast the unsatisfying educative
atmosphere of formal college life with William's renewed receptive capacity
once mountains and lakes are again supplied. For Beattie the minstrel and
the metaphysician are both described as 'visionary', but the clear vision
of the receptive, passive votary is opposed to the clouded vision of the
conceited, blinkered theorist. Beattie writes in starkly personal terms about
this contrast in a letter to Captain Mercer, 26 November 1769, having
recently completed his pious chore of refuting Hume: T am like a man who
has escaped from the mines, and is now drinking in the fresh air and light,
on top of some of the mountains of Dalecarlia' (Letters, I, p. 75). Beattie's
primary quarrel with Hume is not, apparently, epistemological but medical.
Beattie's own hypochondria fuels a correspondence that is steeped in
physical suffering. It is true that much of his mental anxiety was grounded
in real tragedy (his wife suffered from insanity and both his sons were to
die prematurely) but it is, above all, fatalistic diagnoses of his own failing
health that dominate his private letters over the course of decades. The
continuity between Beattie's physical, psychological and intellectual trials
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is remarkable. Contextualising Edwin's adventures in The Minstrel, the
narrator explains that modern philosophy is fast becoming an epidemic of
mental and physical debilitation. Heaven intended the imagination to soar
-
philosophy makes it creep:
Thus Heaven enlarged his soul in riper years.
For Nature gave him strength and fire, to soar
On Fancy's wings above this vale of tears;
Where dark cold-hearted sceptics, creeping, pore
Through microscope of metaphysic lore:
And much they grope for Truth, but never hit.
For why? Their powers, inadequate before,
This art preposterous renders more unfit;
Yet deem they darkness light, and their vain blunders wit.
(Book 1, LI)
Scepticism is a form of progressive myopia
-
destructive 'poring' enfeebles
to the point where healthy and expansive 'vision' becomes impossible.
At the same time, the less people see the more they 'deem' they know.
Elements of Moral Science consolidates this paradigm: 'Every science, and
moral science especially, ought to refresh the mind with the knowledge of
truth, and give strength to the human faculties, by establishing rules for the
regulation of human conduct, both in common life, and in the pursuits of
literature. But this speculative metaphysick can answer no end, that is not
either bad or frivolous'.10
The human intellect requires regular airing. Philosophy should open a
window of refreshing reality in order to regenerate the mind. Hume and
Berkeley, by shutting up all the doors and windows, denying the objective
referential reality of Created Nature, cause fetid air to circulate and
poison the intellectual constitution. Composing The Minstrel was Beattie's
refreshment, and he describes turning from Hume to Edwin as though
he were coming up for air. The Ancients were (as usual) wiser and more
holistic than the Moderns in this respect. Beattie remarks approvingly that
in Athens 'men were not cooped up in palaces and coaches; they were
almost constantly in the open air; and on foot'.11
Despite its sometimes tedious reductionist rhetoric, the 'Common Sense'
school of philosophy (Reid, Beattie, Thomas Campbell and James Oswald)
was not without intellectual credentials; its genealogy runs through
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, with a sideways branch leading to Butler.
Joseph Priestley was surely correct, however, when he warned that the
popularity of'Common Sense' threatened ultimately the end of philosophy
as a discrete discipline. Priestley calculated that at the present rate 'in ten
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years more [ . . . ] the whole business of thinking will be in a manner over,
and we shall have nothing to do but to see and believe.'12 Kant complained
that Beattie's Essay was nothing better than an appeal to the verdict of
the multitude. However Beattie characteristically saw nothing wrong with
qualified majority voting as a test of truth. Philosophers have a responsi-
bility to respect the bulk of humanity and to treat their insights seriously
since among 'the people . . . nature appears with the least disguise' (Essay on
Truth, pp. 466-7). If there is something agreeably democratic about Beattie's
appeal to the 'common sense' axioms of ordinary men and women, there
is also something potentially (and effectively) very reactionary about it. If
common sense is virtually ubiquitous then what is virtually ubiquitous is
common sense, and established systems of government and political econo-
my are best left alone. Beattie's late work, The Elements of Moral Science(1790-3), is urgently anti-revolutionary: to imagine that one can build a
nation on the bold hypotheses of philosophes is a disturbing (if unforeseen)
extension of the primary intellectual sin of Hume
-
that 'indoor' visionary.
Common Sense spoken with an Aberdonian accent belongs therefore to
Burke and not to Paine.
The single most romantic or radical aspect of The Minstrel is its
celebration of potential rather than kinetic energy
-
its suggestion that
'experience' is just corruption by another name. Like Gray, Beattie prefers
promise to performance. He abandoned a third book of The Minstrel in
which Edwin leads his countrymen in battle
-
in other words, where he
actually does something. Edwin's titular calling is an ontological definition
-
he will remain a minstrel whether or not he produces anything; poems
might be symptoms of his identity, but they could never establish or
prove it. The bard or minstrel is the telos rather than the originator of the
creative process, and the close concentration on formative poetic growth
has obvious successors and interesting predecessors. One of Beattie's ear-
liest encouragers was Thomas Blackwell, the Aberdonian professor whose
Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer (1735) is a speculative survey
of the conditions
-
personal, historical, social and geographical
-
required
to produce an epic poet. Blackwell's bard is a loner, materially poor and
prone to introspection. Imaginative endeavour comes easier to those whose
isolation precludes distractions: 'When alone, we are obliged to furnish
out our own Entertainment; we must recollect ourselves and look within,
if there be anything that merits our Attention'.13 The Minstrel similarly
celebrates solitude as the true basis for creative sublimity. Anyone seeking
glory without introspection is deluded by a false aesthetic: 'O Solitude, the
man who thee forgoes, / When lucre lures him, or ambition stings, / Shall
never know the source whence real grandeur springs' (Book II, X).
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Beattie's 'proto-romantic' praise of solitude was already something of a lit-
erary commonplace. Throughout the 1750s and 60s words such as wander,
meander and stray (all formerly associated to varying degrees with sinful
'error') had been re-energised as positive terms of literary value. William
Duffs Essay on Original Genius (1767) proclaims Gray, Young, Ogilvie
and Akenside as the great 'originals' of his day. The measure of immortal
worth of these poets is directly bound up with their lack of contemporary
engagement: 'True Genius, removed from the din and tumult of business
and care, shoots up to the noblest height; it spreads forth all its luxuriance
in the peaceful vale of rural tranquillity'.14 Beattie defends these same poets
in a poem attacking proposals to erect a monument to Charles Churchill
in Westminster Abbey:
Is this the land, where Gray's unlabour'd art
Soothes, melts, alarms, and ravishes the heart
While the lone wanderer's sweet complainings flow
In simple majesty of manly woe
...
15
The fact that Churchill's egocentric digressions will one day be established
as part of the same proto-romantic moment that encompasses Beattie is,
of course, irrelevant. The Abbey's sepulchral vaults must transcend the
'here and now' of polemical discourse or else Poets' Corner becomes Poets'
cul de sac.
Blackwell, Beattie and Gray together produced influential versions of
the itinerant bard, and in doing so explore many of the same issues
suggested by Rousseau's famous competition essay question, the question
as to whether civilisation has diminished rather than enhanced the creative
capacity of humanity?16 Blackwell's Homer taunts degenerate moderns
with their sophisticated diversions partly on the basis that solitude was
easier to come by in antiquity: 'The way to think little, is to hurry from
one Amusement to another, that we may fly from ourselves., (Blackwell,
p. 121). The integrity of a poem becomes a psychological, rather than a
formal or technical qualification. Blackwell's bard wanders both externally
and internally, achieving self-knowledge continuously with bodily exercise.
Homer (anticipating Edward Young) apparently knew that sublimity was
obtained by marvelling at the ambitious yearnings of selfhood. As Beattie
declares: 'It is in the works of nature, particularly in the constitution of
the human soul, that we discern the first and conspicuous traces of the
Almighty' (Beattie, Essay on Truth, pp. 14-15).
In his 'Essay on Poetry and Music' (1776), Beattie takes this auto-
luxuriance a stage further: 'Many things in art and nature exceed
expectation; but nothing sensible transcends, or equals, the capacity of
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thought:
-
a striking evidence of the dignity of the human soul' (Beattie,
Essays, p. 49). Reid makes the same point when refuting Hume: 'When I
look within and consider the mind itself, which makes me capable of all
these prospects and enjoyments; if it is indeed what the Treatise of Human
Nature makes it, I find I have been only in an enchanted castle, imposed
upon by spectres and apparitions'.17 Beattie expanded on this metaphor in
The Castle ofScepticism, an unpublished prose satire on Hume's philosophy
reminiscent of Thomson's Castle of Indolence and Fielding's Journey from
this World to the Next.18 Written in 1767, it depicts Hume as governor of a
gloomy, enchanted castle who dupes his too-willing prisoners into thinking
that the pleasant countryside outside is a land of prejudice and error.
Governor Hume's strange intellectual fancy differs from creative poetic
fancy in that his sceptical philosophy appeals first and foremost to the herd
mentality of fashionable triflers, with their incessant desire for novelty and
paradox. Humean fancy is smugly self-reinforcing but also self-limiting.
His prisoners are too socially insecure to permit common sense ever to
announce that their emperor has no clothes. In the words (already quoted)
of The Minstrel, they 'deem .
. .
darkness light'. The reversal of values in
Hume's castle is anything but liberating as it is enforced by arrogance and
by slavish fashion.
Beattie's Hume has been blessed with good eyesight, but is voluntarily
blind. Although those 'visionary' bards Homer and Milton cannot actually
see the landscapes they describe, their vocational regime cultivates and
sustains their inner life. Inwardness is thus associated with extremes of
inspiration and self-delusion. Significantly, the inward is the terrain of the
great Anglican theologian, Joseph Butler. Beattie's Evidences of the Christian
Religion (1786) cites Butler repeatedly and admiringly.19 In the Essay on
Truth (p. 120), Beattie refers his readers to Butler's Analogy of Religion as
the perfect refutation of Hume's 'flimsy essay', unaware that Hume was
one of Butler's greatest admirers. Hume had considered sending Butler an
early draft of the Treatise, following Butler's critique of empirically derived
theories of causality.
Butler, Berkeley and Hume together demonstrate that fideism and
atheism are two sides of the same coin, albeit it is a coin the majority of
common-sense Christians would rather not see tossed. Beattie does not see
the need for a leap of faith
-
a gentle stroll should suffice; Christian truths
may be sublime, but do not require a sublime imagination to absorb them,
just a sane and a humble spirit. The evidence for Christianity may be 'too
sublime' for Hume but 'to the humble and tender-hearted, is altogether
overwhelming, irresistible, and divine' (Beattie, Essay on Truth, p. 112).
Beattie comes to minister not to the sick but to those easily shamed out
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of their hypochondria. He intends not to cure the sceptic but to reassure
those frightened by the intellectual credentials of scepticism. His appeal is
to aesthetic solidarity: sublimity is something that is either understood or it
is not. In a similar vein, the dying Lord Kames explained to Boswell the real
cause of Hume's infidelity (4 December 1782): 'David's atheism was owing
to his want of sensibility. He did not perceive the benevolence of the Deity in
all his works. He had not taste, and therefore did not relish Shakespeare'.20
Beattie would have applauded this diagnosis. Voltaire, another inhabitant
of The Castle of Scepticism, augments and reinforces his other impieties
by pouring scorn on Shakespeare and Milton. It is no accident that the
aesthetic school of Christian apologetics develops concurrently with the
accelerating perfection of bardolatory in literary history. In a letter to
Robert Arbuthnot (26 November 1785), Beattie rhapsodised over Elizabeth
Montagu's response to Voltaire's attack on Shakespeare (Letters, II, p. 137).
Shakespeare weighs in alongside the constructively empirical philosophers
in Beattie's roll of honour: 'Would you know what genius is, and where it
may be found? Go to Shakespeare, to Bacon, to Montesquieu, to Rousseau;
and when you have studied them, return, if you can, to hume, and hobbes,
and malebranche, and liebnitz, and spinosa' (Beattie, Essay on Truth, p. 453).
From Shakespeare we can construct a true representation of humanity,
whereas Hume's Treatise 'would convey no information to the planetary
stranger' (Beattie, Essay on Truth, p. 458). Even extra-terrestrials prefer
Shakespeare to phenomenology. In a letter to Charles Boyd (16 November
1766), Beattie asks 'Do not you think there is a sort of antipathy between
philosophical and poetical genius?
. . .
Poetry exhibits general qualities of a
species, philosophy the particular qualities of individuals' (Letters, I, p. 36).
Poetry is supposedly truer than philosophy because it has to acknowledge
ill-defined, generalised sentiment. Lack of precision is therefore the poet's
advantage and opportunity. The Minstrel has harsh words for those who
delimit the scope of experience with their close metaphysical formulae:
Hence! ye who snare and stupefy the mind,
Sophists, of beauty, virtue, joy, the bane!
Greedy and fell, though impotent and blind,
Who spread your filthy nets in Truth's fair fane.
And ever ply your venom'd fangs amain!
Hence to dark Error's den, whose rankling slime
First gave you form! hence! Lest the Muse should deign,(Though loath on any theme so mean to waste a rhyme)
With vengeance to pursue your sacrilegious crime.(Book I, XLI)
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Unlike Campbell and Reid, Beattie did not know (and like) Hume, and
was disinclined to treat him with any scholarly deference. He refused to
assimilate the widespread accounts of Hume's practical common sense
and benevolence. Beattie, unashamedly angry about the Essay on Miracles,
is less philosophically cogent and more readable than almost any other
contributor to the debate. Having been (as he saw it) personally injured
by Hume, Beattie designed the Essay on Truth as, in part, a work of
hard psycho- and physiotherapy. Reading contemporary metaphysics is for
Beattie at best a disagreeable inoculation
-
a controlled form of exposure
that will hopefully help him build up and transmit a resistance to a
spreading virus of conceited scepticism. Only by berating the arrogance and
corruption of the philosophic intellect can Beattie properly juxtapose and
define his own positive norms of value, norms which were being poetically
formalised simultaneously in The Minstrel.
Within a hectic polemical context, key Wordsworthian themes emerge
-
recollection, renovation, and restoration
-
preoccupations that make The
Minstrel one of the four or five most influential poems of its time. As a
vindicator of naive presupposition as a basis for philosophical truth, Beattie
is a decisive celebrant of childhood. Youthful innocence is an essential
emblem within his own system of moral oppositions. At the opposite
pole from the young impressionable Edwin, Beattie imagines something
like the famous Alan Ramsay portrait of Hume, over-fed, over-dressed and
over-read.
Ultimately, I would appear to be arguing that early romanticism devel-
oped in the way it did becauseJames Beattie's inability to cope with Humean
epistemology forced him to go and take long walks in the country. Simplistic
as this may sound, it nonetheless seems to me to be one valid way of
considering the issue. Beattie's insistence that there is a limit to the quality
of wisdom that can be acquired sitting at a desk becomes, before very long,
a serious and an influential way of thinking. When threatened by modern
philosophy, head for the hills, where the insane truths of the metaphysician
evaporate under the sane regime of the physician. Considered as a whole,
Beattie's career dramatises a lifelong wrestling with different concepts of
truth. Reid and Beattie concluded that intuitive truth is preferable to
deductive truth since all deduction is derived from the juxtaposition of
self-evident axioms. True wisdom consists of that 'negative capability' of
withholding the epistemological scalpel and resting in a state of faith:
'Truth, like Virtue, to be loved, needs only to be seen' (Beattie, Essay on
Truth, p. 19). Once people start treating created nature as mere sense-
data, with no necessary objective existence, they are on a slippery slope to
oblivion. Beattie, Campbell and Reid intend to chase this fatal error back
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to Descartes and re-institute the reality of experiential knowledge assumed
by Bacon. The proto-romantic elements of Beattie's poetic credo require
this philosophical victory: without sane empiricism one cannot have wise
passivity. No one can stand and feel the truth of Nature while staging
interminable hermeneutic contests between the relative merits of primary
and secondary ideas.
Sane empiricism is the working method of childish education; childhood
is the place where things are not yet mediated and compromised by words.
Over-exposure to the culture of adult humanity causes us to forget and
discredit the numinous power of the physical world. Beattie exclaims: 'Shall
I suffer the ambiguities of artificial language to prevail against the clear,
the intelligible, the irresistible voice of nature?' (Beattie, Essay on Truth,
p. 71). By artificial language, Beattie means of course sophistical language
-
language that is artfully contrived. However, the attempts to delineate
abstracted unmediated peaks of experience in The Minstrel could imply
that he secretly distrusts all human language. Indoors you confront words
-
outdoors you confront things. Edwin prefers roaming over a referent to
sweating over a signifier.
This linguistic 'anti-structuralist' reading of The Minstrel becomes more
plausible when Beattie's intimacy with Reid is considered. He had not
only read Reid's book, he had many times heard Reid explain it. Reid
expounded two distinct dimensions of communication
-
natural and
'artificial' language the former being divinely implanted, a meta-grammar
of communicative competence. Without this sacred gift, the facility of
language would not and could not be ubiquitous. In an astonishing
digression, Reid goes further, and speaks of linguistic sophistication as a
diminution, a falling off of the creative potential of humanity: 'Abolish the
use of articulate sounds and writing among mankind for a century, and
every man would be a painter, an actor, and an orator' (Reid, Inquiry, p.
109). The idea that everyone would become a creative spirit if deprived
of the power of speech is, I would argue, a profoundly romantic notion.
Proto-romantic auto-luxuriance enables silence to become a precondition
of expressiveness. Silent solitary Edwin, eyes open to the mountains and the
heavens has access to an expansively fruitful dimension of experience that
the world inhibits only with great loss. The less he talks, the more he speaks.
This resonant but mute figure, familiar to us through the Prelude, will one
day attract the scrutiny of Lacan and Kristeva. The reconstruction of a pre-
symbolic semiotic chora is a suggestive response to Hume, and Beattie's
one genuine, albeit rhetorical, contribution to philosophy: 'children ... do
generally, if not always, speak as they think, and ... it has passed into a
proverb, that children and fools tell truth' (Beattie, Essay on Truth, p. 136).
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Beattie's most astonishing depiction of childlike wisdom is that of his
own elder son, James Hay Beattie, whose learning, piety and creative
potential make him read like an amalgam of Edwin, Chatterton and the
young Wordsworth
-
a marvellous boy with a vengeance. This paragon of
innocence and promise died in 1790, aged twenty-two, and his father soon
contrived the publication of his literary remains, together with an account
of his short life and long list of qualifications (he had been made Assistant
Professor of Moral Philosophy at Marischal at the age of eighteen). No
matter how much learning the boy absorbed, he still preserved his naive
simplicity and a miraculous resistance to adult corruptions: 'He could
instantly, and almost intuitively, discern what in human conduct was right
or wrong, . . . not only in matters of morality and science but in the
general intercourse of the world. ... I never went wrong by following his
advice'.21 Like Edwin 'he was not frequently seen in the street; a laudable
regard to health, and a passionate love of rural scenery, leading him to daily
excursions in the fields' (James Hay Beattie, p. 66). Like his father, James
Hay worshipped Gray's poetry: his fragmentary magnum opus, A Poem on
the Excellence oj Christianity, opens with an invocation of Deity consisting
entirely of a roll call of great British poets: Shakespeare, Pope, Gray and
Milton. The creation of a bard is an evidence of Divinity presumably more
potent than any formal argument from design.
Even Divinity cannot grow a bard in a greenhouse. James Beattie's
investigation of the bardic psyche appears even more quasi-religious when
his poetic and the philosophical endeavours are considered together.
Beattie, with Christ-like condescension, takes on the distressing burden of
reading and thinking about Hume. He descends into Hell on our behalf,
undergoes pain, and is resurrected in glory, firstly at the Sheldonian Theatre(9 July 1773) (where the awarding of his honorary doctorate provoked
'special applause'), and latterly in Reynold's painting. He ventures into the
netherworld of the artificial in order to reclaim and vindicate the natural
and the transcendental.
It is clear that David Hume unwittingly provided the context for Beattie's
romantic exploration of his own formative state of precognition, since The
Minstrel cannot be dislocated from the intellectual and emotional demands
of forging the Essay on Truth. Writing to the Dowager Lady Forbes, 12 Oc-
tober 1772, Beattie admits the autobiographical elements in The Minstrel.
Dramatic scenery 'had charms in my eyes, even when I was a schoolboy;
and at a time when I was so far from being able to express, that I did not
understand my own feelings' (Letters, I, 98). As a schoolboy he had one day
climbed a lofty eminence to achieve a first sight of the ocean that he would
recall intensely for the rest of his life:
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And oft the craggy cliff he loved to climb,
When all in mist the world below was lost.
What dreadful pleasure! there to stand sublime,
Like shipwreck'd mariner on desert coast,
And view th'enormous waste of vapour, tost
In billows, lengthening to th'horizon round,
Now scoop'd in gulfs, with mountains now emboss'd!
And hear the voice of mirth and song rebound,
Flocks, herds, and waterfalls, along the hoar profound!
(Book I, XXI)
Sublimity is here drawn as a vaporous confusion of big, raw elements:
the stanza does not try to interpret the experience in moral (let alone
theological) terms. Beattie's dreadful pleasure resembles that of J. M. W.
Turner, strapped to the mast, the better to paint 'Steamer in a Snowstorm'(1842).
This sort of sublime abstraction had an excitement for Beattie that
nonetheless failed to disrupt his own religious and political orthodoxy.
Empiricism reassures him while abstraction humbles yet excites. Beattie
offers a mixture of knowledge and ignorance; he combines childlike faith in
the instructive reality ofNature with an honest inability to dissect or delimit
the totality and immensity of Nature's impact. It is true that the romantic
tendencies within his poetry and prose were originally intended primarily
as bold tropes designed to reinforce a set of very familiar messages, and
that he identified the Author of the Sublime absolutely with the God of the
Scriptures. However, the same techniques of spiritual consolation and self-
reinforcement offered by Beattie would one day be appropriated by that
bold atheist, Percy Shelley:
Whosoever is free from the contamination of luxury and licence may
go forth into the fields and to the woods inhaling joyous renovation
from the breath of Spring, or catching from the odours and sounds of
autumn, some diviner mood of sweetest sadness which improves the
heart. Whosoever is no deceiver or destroyer of his fellow men, no liar,
no flatterer, no murderer may walk among his species, deriving from
the communion with all which they contain ofbeautiful or ofmajestic,
some intercourse with the Universal God. Whoever had maintained
with his own heart the strictest correspondence of confidence, who
dares to examine and to estimate every imagination which suggests
itself to his mind, who is that which he designs to become, and only
aspires to that which the divinity of his own nature shall consider and
approve . . . he, has already seen God.22
James Beattie and the Great Outdoors 33
Shelley builds this paragraph in order to effect a continuous progression
from traditional Christian pastoral through 'ecumenical' deism towards
the atheism of romantic auto-sublimity. The seamlessness of this progress
is (from a Christian perspective) especially frightening. It is a brief but
irrevocable step from seeing evidence of Divinity within the constitution
of every awakened sensibility to seeing Divinity as awakened sensibility. As
ever, Beattie appears to have been unaware of the stakes, unaware of the full
consequences ofprosecuting his intellectual and imaginative methods. The
shy, sickly polymath from Aberdeen, while making his appeal to intuitive
childlike impulses, helped unleash forces he could not hope to delimit or
control, p
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